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This article assesses the effectiveness of a novel macroprudential tool –
the reserve option mechanism (ROM) – which Turkey’s central bank
developed during the post-2008 period and has employed to control the
risk associated with excessive capital flows. We assess how capital flows
have affected economic variable changes since the introduction and
usage of the ROM. Empirical evidence gathered from Turkey suggests
that the tool decreases the effect of capital flow on capital flow (positive
shock to capital flow dies out faster or becomes less persistent) and
diminishes the effects of capital flow shocks on exchange and interest
rates.
Keywords: macroeconomic prudential tools; reserve option mechanism;
capital flows
JEL Classification: E58; E52; E42
I. Introduction
Following the 2008 financial crisis, central banks
adopted various policy tools to address the challenges
of the new economic environment. Most of these tools
are considered macroprudential tools and might be
seen as unconventional, with their use limited to
extraordinary post-crisis periods. However, if they
prove beneficial, these tools can still be used in stable
conditions. Indeed, that crisis has shown that mone-
tary and fiscal policies, on the one side, and micro and
macro policy tools, on the other side, are not merely
complementary but part of a complete toolbox to
address the new economic environment. That is, if
meaningful and rich, a sound policy set can be com-
piled such that each policy tool can be used whenever
necessary. Blanchard et al. (2013) explain this concept
as harmonizing a broad-scoped but instantly effective
monetary policy and more-targeted fiscal measures
(although their time lag limits the usefulness of the
latter). The authors place macroprudential tools into
three main categories: (1) tools to influence lender
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behaviour, i.e. capital requirements and leverage
ratios; (2) tools to influence borrower behaviour, i.e.
capping loan-to-value (LTV) ratios or debt-to-income
(DTI) ratios; and (3) tools to influence both lender and
borrower behaviours by capital flow management.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no single
policy authority in the world that utilizes all of
these categories of tools at the same time. There
are two reasons for this. First, as is also men-
tioned by the IMF (2011), there are two prerequi-
site conditions (among others) to classifying any
macro tool as macroprudential: (1) systemic risk
should be targeted explicitly and specifically and
(2) necessary governance arrangements should be
ensured to synchronize all related institutions.
Therefore, as the scope of macroprudential poli-
cies increases to cover the above three categories,
it becomes harder to satisfy the prerequisite con-
ditions. The second reason why all these tools are
not used at the same time is that every economy
needs a specific category of tools depending on
the level of its financial and economic develop-
ment. Working on macroprudential policies in 119
different countries between 2000 and 2013,
Cerutti et al. (2015) claim that emerging econo-
mies mostly choose tools in the third category.
Blanchard et al. (2013) elaborate this, suggesting
that developing countries use macroprudential
tools to affect foreign exchange while advanced
countries use such tools to lead borrower
behaviour.
There is also an increasing amount of empirical
evidence on measuring the effectiveness of each
category of macroprudential tools. Clerc et al.
(2014) use a dynamic general equilibrium model
that features the defaults of various borrower groups
to measure the influence of the first category of
macroprudential tools (such as capital requirements,
countercyclical capital buffers and sectoral risk
weights) on economic performance. Their results
include three main inferences: (1) there is generally
an optimal level of capital requirements; (2) the
lower a bank’s capital ratio (or the higher its lever-
age), the greater the scope for amplification of real
and financial shocks; and (3) a moderate degree of
countercyclical adjustments of capital requirements
may significantly improve the benefits of setting
these requirements at a high level. Claessens et al.
(2014) track the effects of macroprudential policies
between 2000 and 2010 in 48 countries and 2800
banks, and find that the second category of tools, i.e.
setting caps on LTV and DTI ratios, significantly
decreases credit growth (specifically foreign cur-
rency lending) and asset growth. Taking into
account 13 Asian economies and 33 economies in
other regions since 2000, Zhang and Zoli (2014)
show that capital flow measures in the third cate-
gory, such as broad limits on foreign currency bor-
rowing, specific reserve requirements on foreign
currency deposits or additional provisioning
requirements on foreign exchange lending, help
reduce housing price growth, equity flows, credit
growth and bank leverage. (See Claessens (2014)
and Galati and Moessner (2014) for an excellent,
more-detailed theoretical discussion and literature
review on the effectiveness of macroprudential
tools.)
This article reports the effects of the reserve
option mechanism (ROM), a tool developed by the
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to
cope with the country’s excessive capital flows,
which increased systematic risk in its macro-
balances.1 In particular, we assess how capital
flows affect economic performance variables, such
as exchange rate, interest rate, output and prices,
and how these effects change with the different
levels of ROM usage. The empirical evidence gath-
ered in the article reveals that ROM usage decreases
the effect of capital flows on exchange rate and
interest rates as well as decreases the persistency
of capital flow shocks.
Understanding the ROM: rationale and purpose
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, large foreign
capital flows into Turkey, triggered by the expan-
sionary monetary policies of the world’s major cen-
tral banks, have created a new kind of challenge for
the CBRT.2 Capital flows have been forcing up the
value of the Turkish Lira (TL) against foreign cur-
rency, increasing domestic liquidity and the credit
supply of domestic banks to the private sector, and
1Alper et al. (2012, p. 7) write that the ‘ROM essentially aims at reducing the detrimental effects of volatile capital flows on
domestic markets by [bridging] the gap between [the] supply and demand of foreign currency’.
2 From 2007 to 2013, the M2 growth rates of the US, the UK and Japan was 29.27%, 20.40% and 14.39%, respectively
(Source: World Development Indicators).
































thus widening the current account deficit, accumulat-
ing risk.3 In response, the CBRT developed a tool to
assist with its already-complex task: assuring finan-
cial stability.4
When the ROM was introduced, it was clearly
stated that its purpose is the ‘timely, controlled and
effective provision of liquidity to the market in case
of financial turmoil’ (CBRT, 2011, p. 1). Thus, it was
expected that the ROM would introduce a system
that would work like a reservoir. During capital
flow, ROM usage would rise (increases central bank
reserves) and during capital outflow ROM usage
would lower (decreases central bank reserves).
However, financial turmoil in 2013 showed that
the ROM did not function in this manner. At the
same time, the motivation of the ROM is ‘to help
increase the resilience of the economy against exter-
nal finance shocks and achieve financial stability’
(IMF, 2011, p. 13). This mandate includes decreasing
exchange rate fluctuation and credit expansion due to
converting foreign exchange inflows into bank lend-
ing. The latter decreases the effect of capital inflows
on aggregate demand. In other words, the ROM
might work because capital flowwill affect economic
performance less. The given change (shock) to capi-
tal flow will thus affect the relevant macroeconomic
variable less, which is the proposition that we test.
Conventional policy tools such as short-term inter-
est rate may not deliver the desired outcomes in the
new economic environment. Based on the challenges
that have emerged since the 2008 financial crisis, the
CBRT has defined financial stability as a goal sup-
plementary to price stability and divided its policy
tools into three categories: a direct credit policy, an
interest rate policy and a liquidity policy (Kara,
2012). The first two policies were unremarkable;
the direct credit policy aimed to reduce the level of
banking credits through reserve requirements, and
the interest rate policy set a short-term (weekly)
funding rate rather than overnight rates. The essence
of the new scheme was the liquidity policy, which
comprised macro andmicro tools, such as the interest
rate corridor, a funding strategy and the ROM.5
The interest rate corridor, formed by locking the
average CBRT funding rate between its overnight
borrowing and lending rates, was the first tool intro-
duced. Alper et al. (2012) note that this tool has
directly affected economic agents’ short-term portfolio
decisions, which in turn have affected foreign
exchange rate volatility. The funding strategy is
designed to reflect the CBRT’s perception of liquidity
adequacy: the CBRT determines whether (1) funding
will be via daily, weekly or monthly repos; (2) funding
will be via market-maker banks’ intermediation; or (3)
whether there will be any funding at all.6 As with the
interest rate corridor, this funding strategy can also
affect economic agents’ short-term portfolio decisions.
The ROM affects domestic banks’ decisions about
their balance sheets, allowing (though not obliging)
banks to keep some ratio (called the reserve option
ratio (ROR)) of their required TL reserves as foreign
exchange (US dollars (USD)) and/or gold. The
amount of USD and/or gold corresponding to the
TL requirement is computed by multiplying the TL
requirement with a reserve option coefficient (ROC)
for each segment of the ROR.7 In this way, banks
3According to Yorukoglu and Cufadar (2008), during the years 2002–2007, following high amounts of capital inflows such
as stocks, securities and money market instruments, the CBRT also started to accumulate foreign currency reserves.
Between 2002 and 2007, the sum of yearly net foreign portfolio inflows as stocks (15 billion USD) and government
securities (17.4 USD) was 32.4 billion USD, but had increased to 86.8 billion (30 billion as stocks and 56.7 billion as
government securities) by 2014 (Source: CBRT EVDS, Balance of Payments Detailed Presentation).
4 Please see Galati and Moessner (2014) for an excellent review of the literature on macroprudential policies and their
effects on economic performance.
5 See Başçı and Kara (2011) and Kara (2012) for detailed information on the new policy set-up. Mr Başçı is governor of the
CBRT and Mr Kara is the director general of the CBRT’s research department.
6 Sometimes the CBRT does not hold its weekly repo auction. These instances are called ‘exceptional days’, and the CBRT
does not fund the market on those days. Similarly, sometimes it announces ‘short-term additional monetary tightening’,
which includes intra-day foreign exchange selling auctions plus market funding by the upper band of the interest rate
corridor (on normal days the CBRT funds market-maker banks at the lower rate).
7 The ROM practice of using the foreign exchange allowance instead of the TL began in September 2011, by setting the ROR as
10% and the ROC as 1. Subsequently, the policy developed by defining different ROR segments and corresponding coefficients.
As of October 2013, up to 60% of TL reserve requirements may be kept in foreign currency. The first 30% of the allowed foreign
exchange partition is accepted by beingmultiplied by 1.4. The coefficients for each subsequent 5% increase are 1.5, 1.8, 2.2, 2.5,
2.7 and 2.8, respectively. The gold option has a similar story. It began on the same date as the ROR and ROC, and as of October
2013, up to 30% of TL reserve requirements can be kept as gold. The first 15% of the allowed gold partition is accepted by being
multiplied by 1.4. The coefficients for each subsequent 5% increase are 1.5, 2 and 2.5, respectively.
































have the option of leaving the cheaper funded capital
to the CBRT to boost their profitability.
The CBRT defines the ROM as an automatic stabi-
lizer: banks’ decisions to keep their TL reserve
requirements as foreign exchange or gold depend on
funding costs, i.e. interest rates. When the ROM was
introduced in September 2011, its coefficients (ROC)
were low and have adjusted over time.8 Thus, we may
not have enough observations for the period that ROM
usage was stable and changed at the discretion of the
banking system to assess its reservoir role.
Importantly, the purpose of this article is not to assess
whether the ROM is an effective reservoir during
capital outflows but to determine whether it plays a
cousin role in suppressing the effect of capitalflows on
economic performance.9 Therefore, when capital
inflow is high, the decrease in foreign currency interest
rates encourages banks to keep the required reserves in
foreign currency rather than in TL, which steers
incoming foreign capital to the CBRT rather than
converting these foreign-currency-denominated capi-
tal flows into domestic currency. In this way, domestic
liquidity is increased and thus domestic demand less to
contributing financial stability.10
The CBRT thus utilizes the ROM to allow the
financial market to stabilize exchange rate volatility
(from abundant but disordered capital inflows) on its
own as much as possible. To regulate the domestic
credit line, the CBRT also expects the ROM to be
effective on foreign exchange, and thus on TL
liquidity.11
In order to assess how the introduction of the ROM
affects the relationship between capital flow and
economic performance, we provide a set of descrip-
tive analyses. Figure 1 reports these analyses.
Figure 1(a) reports the depreciation rate of the TL
against the USD. Figure 1(b) reports the moving SD
of exchange rate through the windows of 12 observa-
tions. Figure 1(b) suggests reducing the SD of the
USD exchange rate (depreciation) after the introduc-
tion of the ROM in September 2011. The remaining
figures report the estimated coefficients of the rolling
regression exchange rate, interest rate, industrial pro-
duction and prices (inflation) on two measures of
capital flow (current account and gross portfolio
investment). Here we use the 12 observations as a
sliding window for all the variables except interest
rate. When we use interest rate as a regressor, we use
18 observations for the sliding window because,
especially for the period prior to the ROM’s introduc-
tion, interest rate was constant and the estimated
parameters were unstable. Last, to see the effect of
capital flow decreases, we report the absolute value
of the estimated parameters. At the early stages of the
estimated coefficients, the signs of the coefficients
were parallel with what the economic theory sug-
gests. Figure 1(c)–(j) clearly suggests that after the
introduction of the ROM the effect of capital flows
on exchange rate and interest rate decreases, but we
could not see a similar pattern for industrial produc-
tion or prices.
In this article, we test the effectiveness of the ROM
policy by using an interactive vector autoregression
(IVAR)model.We present our methodology and data
in Sections II and III, respectively, discuss the
empirical evidence in Section IV and lay out our
conclusions in Section V.
II. Methodology
In order to capture the effect of capital flow on
economic performance, we employ a VAR model.
8Note that the deposit interest rate for domestic currency is relative to the foreign-currency-denominated deposit rate. Thus,
the CBRT has the incentive to increase ROM usage as ROC-adjusted ROM usage increases.
9 The ROM is a derivative tool set-up under the reserve requirement policy. Therefore, by its nature, it might well be defined
as part of the reservoir function of the reserve requirement policy. However, when introduced, it was clearly stated that its
aim is to meet the TL liquidity requirements of the banking sector in a timely, controlled and efficient manner under
financial turmoil while building up the CBRT’s foreign exchange reserves (see the CBRT’s Press Release No. 2011-35 on
Required Reserves, Rediscount Credit Implementations and Foreign Exchange Selling Auctions.) Referring to this
explanation, the ROM should be regarded as a tap attached to the required reserves. If this definition is true, the research
should concentrate on the effectiveness of this tap function by seeking an answer to the question of whether it works to
decrease the impact of capital flow volatility on the CBRT’s balance sheet, rather than focusing on whether the reserve
requirement’s reservoir function works as a whole (see CBRT Economic Notes No. 2012-28/22, October 2012, pp. 8–10,
for a simple example of a balance sheet analysis of the ROM function).
10 See Alper et al. (2012) and Küçüksaraç and Özel (2012), respectively, for more information on how the ROMworks and
for an analytical exercise regarding how it affects economic performance.
11Oduncu et al. (2013) show that credit growth volatility diminished after the CBRT adopted the ROM.
































We then use impulse response analyses to assess how
capital flows will affect the relevant variable, such as
interest rate, exchange rate and output over time. The
purpose of this article is to show that since the
ROM’s introduction, and at different levels of the
ROM, its usage by commercial banks will change.
In other words, the coefficients of the VAR specifica-
tions change with the use of the ROM as well as at
different levels of ROM usage. We effectively use
two samples: one for the period when the ROM was
zero (i.e. when it was not employed) and the other
when the ROM was not zero but changing. We cap-
ture how the effect of capital flows on economic
performance changes with the ROM by using the
interactive term. To assess the effectiveness of the
ROM on curving capital flows, we use an IVAR
similar to Tobwin and Weber’s (2011a) and
Saborowski and Weber’s (2013) interacted panel
VAR (IPVAR). We modify the IPVAR slightly to
apply it to our time-series data, with the resulting
specification written as follows:
A0Yt ¼ C þ
XL
k¼1




where t ¼ 1; 2;    ; T
Figure 1.A. Exchange Rate Figure 1.B. Exchange Rate Volatility
Figure 1.C. Exchange Rate on CA Figure 1.D. Interest Rate on CA
Figure 1.E. Industrial Production on CA Figure 1.F. Inflation on CA
Figure 1.G. Exchange Rate on Portfolio Figure 1.H. Interest Rate on Portfolio
Figure 1.I. Industrial Production on Portfolio Figure 1.J. Inflation on Portfolio
Fig. 1. Exchange rate and interest rate pass-through to capital flows
































Y is a q × 1 vector of explanatory variables, Ak
and Bk are a q × q matrix of coefficients and ut
stands for the uncorrelated iid residual terms. The
necessary condition for the model is that the
variables should be integrated in order zero. L is
the lag order. Xt is the interaction term, scalar for
each t, which stands for the dynamic relationship
among the endogenous variables. The interaction
term is also allowed to affect the intercept term.
Here, we have A0 as a lower triangular matrix,
and thus we identify the shocks through the
Cholesky decomposition.
The above equation can therefore be written as
A0Yt ¼ C I þ XtItð Þ þ
XL
k¼1
Ak þ BkXtð ÞYtk þ ut
To assess the effect of capital flows on the macro-
economic variables, we estimate the following recur-
sive IVAR model:
where Cap.flow is the volume of capital inflows
relative to GDP, Exchange is the TL equivalent of
USD, Interest is the CBRT’s funding rate, Output
is the value of production, Prices is consumer
prices, ut is the iid uncorrelated error term and
μt is the vector for the constant term. We include
11 monthly dummies to account for seasonality,
and also include crisis dummy variables for
1994:04, 1994:05, 2000:11, 2001:02 and
2001:03. The critical assumption here is that αjkl;t
s are left to systematically vary according to a
rule, depending on the ROR and ROC defined by
the ROM:
αjkl;t ¼ βjkl;1 þ βjkl;2romt
Here, romt is the percentage change in reserve
options that is used by the banking sector relative to
central bank reserves.
III. Data
We use monthly data from January 1992 to June
2013 to construct an IVARmodel with five variables:
capital flow, exchange rate, interest rate, industrial
production and prices. The Appendix provides the
definitions and sources of the variables. We took the
logarithmic first differences of USD, Ip and Cpi to
satisfy the stationarity condition of the IVAR speci-
fication, as discussed by Towbin and Weber (2011b,
p. 17). Although logarithmic differencing may not
capture the effects of high inflation and currency
depreciation, using a stationary series is one of the
required properties of the IVAR method. In order to
eliminate the adverse effect of this method, we report
the accumulated impulse responses rather than the
impulse responses on levels. All data are gathered
from the CBRT’s electronic data delivery system
except for the ROM data, which are gathered from
the CBRT’s July 2013 inflation report.
The ROMwas introduced in September 2011, thus
only data after this date are available and can be
reported. Figure 2 reports the percentage change in
reserve options that is used by the banking sector
relative to central bank reserves. For our sample,
we have 22 observations, where the ROM average
is 0.043056 and its SE is 0.019922.
In the model, capital flows are represented by two
highly sensitive macro variables: current account
deficit (CA) and gross portfolio investments
(Portfolio) in USD. The former is one of the easiest
variables to observe and one of the most important
macro variables regarding the Turkish economy’s
vulnerability. The latter is one of the most volatile
variables in balance-of-payment statistics. Therefore,
for comparison and accuracy, we estimate the model
twice, once using current account deficit and once
using gross portfolio investments, to represent capital
flows. Because we use the lagged value of the
denominator, both of these variables enter to the
1 0 0 0 0
α210 1 0 0 0
α310 α
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specification in their ratio to the lagged values of
interpolated monthly GDP in USD to avoid
simultaneity.
Although we take overnight interest rate as the
interest rate (Int) until August 2010, thereafter,
following the shift in funding policy, we use the
monetary policy interest rate. We use romt to cap-
ture the effect of the ROM. The data are used as
the change in ROM usage in terms of foreign
exchange and gold to the central bank’s gross
domestic reserves.
IV. Empirical Evidence
Figure 3 reports the conventional cumulative
impulse responses of capital flow, exchange rate,
interest rate, output and prices for 18 months when
a 1 SD shock is given to capital flow, and where
capital flow is measured with the current account
deficit. Thus, we gather the cumulative impulse
responses when the ROM effect is not present or
when romt = 0. The middle line shows the impulse
responses and the other two lines show the
Fig. 2. Graph of the rom (October 2011–January 2015)
Source: CBRT and own calculations.
Fig. 3. Impulse responses to capital flow (current account) shock with no-ROM
































confidence intervals of the 1 SD. To calculate the
confidence bands, we use Towbin and Weber’s
(2011a) bootstrap procedure with 1000 draws. The
cumulative impulse responses suggest that the
shock to capital flow is persistent, and it immedi-
ately decreases exchange rate (appreciation of local
currency), interest rates and prices, but increases
output in a persistent manner. These results are
parallel with Berument and Dincer (2004) for
Turkey. Only the effect of capital flow shock on
output is not statistically significant.
Next, we compare the two impulse responses. In
Figs 4–10, the impulse responses in the first column
are produced by taking ROM usage as zero. These are
Fig. 4. Impulse responses to capital flow (current account) shock when ROM is at the 0 and 75th percentiles for
four periods
Fig. 5. Impulse responses to capital flow (current account) shock when ROM is at the 0 and 50th percentiles for
four periods
































the same impulse responses as in Fig. 3. However,
when comparing columns of Figs 4–10, we see that
the scales of the first columns are different. In the
second column of Fig. 4, ROM usage is equal to its
75th percentile (of the historical data after September
2011).We report impulse responses for four periods to
make the comparison more visible under different
ROM usages. The second column suggests that the
shock to the current account deficit is not persistent.
After 1.5 periods, the effect of capital flow on capital
flow dies out. For the remaining impulse responses,
the effects are not statistically significant. Thus, the
effect of capital flows could be eliminated if the ROM
growth rate is set to its 75th percentile.
Figure 5 repeats the same comparison by setting
the ROM growth rate to its 50th percentile in the
Fig. 6. Impulse responses to capital flow (current account) shock when ROM is at the 0 and 25th percentiles for
four periods
Fig. 7. Impulse responses to capital flow (gross portfolio flow) shock with no-ROM
































second column, while the first column remains zero,
as in Fig. 2. In this instance, ROM growth rate is 0%.
Here, current account shocks persist and the
decreases in interest rate and prices are still statisti-
cally significant. The effects on exchange rate and
output are not statistically significant.
Figure 6 compares the impulse responses on the
same variables by taking ROM growth as the 25th
percentile in the second column. Virtually, there is no
difference between the first two columns; they exhibit
responses of no-ROM and 25th percentile increases in
ROM situations, respectively. Therefore, we cannot
Fig. 8. Impulse responses to capital flow (gross portfolio flow) shock when ROM is at the 0 and 75 percentiles for
four periods
Fig. 9. Impulse response to capital flow (gross portfolio flow) shock when ROM is at the 0 and 50th percentiles for
four periods
































claim that the effect of capital flows could be elimi-
nated by increasing the ROM this much. This result
clearly suggests that as long as the CBRT ensures the
ROM growth rate is high enough it could decrease the
effect of capital flow. However, the sustainability of
this constrained policy option is debatable.
Figures 7–10 report the same exercises as Figs 3–6,
but mimic capital flows with gross portfolio flows (i.e.
a shock is given to gross portfolio capital flows). For
normalization, we also take the lag value of the USD
value of the interpolated monthly GDP. Gross capital
flows are important because they are one of the
main sources of current account deficit financing
(Başçı, 2013a) and are positively sensitive to income
growth (Başçı, 2013b). However, the volatility of
capital flows may increase Turkey’s misalignment
problems in currency and credit (Başçı, 2013c).
Figure 7 suggests that a 1 SD shock permanently
increases capital flow for 18 months, appreciates
local currency and decreases interest rates. The
effects on output and prices are positive and negative,
respectively, as expected, but these results are not
statistically significant.
Figure 8 suggests that when the ROM growth rate
is set at the 75th percentile the effect of capital flow
on capital flow is not persistent. Although persis-
tent, the effects of the shock on exchange rate,
interest rate, output and prices are not statistically
significant. These results are parallel with the above
specification, which employs current account to
measure capital flows.
Figures 9 and 10 repeat the exercise by setting
ROM growth rates at the 50th and 25th percentiles,
respectively. In the former, capital flow is still persis-
tent (as in the no-ROM situation) but the effects of
the capital flow shock on exchange rate, interest rate,
output and prices are not statistically significant,
similar to the ROMgrowth rate in the 75th percentile.
In the latter, the impulse responses of the connected
variables are similar to when the ROM growth rate
was set to the zero percentile.
V. Conclusions
Central banks developed innovative tools to cope
with the new challenges in the post-2008 financial
market. Keeping price stability as its main policy
target, the CBRTconsidered financial stability a com-
plementary target and employed a new set of tools,
including the ROM, to achieve both of the targets. In
the face of capital flow shocks, the CBRT aims to
decrease the effect of capital flows on economic
performance such that part of this flow may go to
the CBRT to increase its reserves rather than go to
financial markets directly. Thus, the CBRT devel-
oped an incentive mechanism for commercial
banks such that they may substitute part of their
Fig. 10. Impulse response to capital flow (gross portfolio flow) shock when ROM is at the 0 and 25th percentiles for
four periods
































local-currency-denominated liabilities with their for-
eign exchange reserves or with gold. Thus, currency
appreciation will be lower at a given level of capital
flows at a higher level of the ROM. The effect of
capital flows on interest rate, output and prices will
be lower at a higher usage of the ROM for a given
change in capital flows as well.
In other words, this article assesses whether the
ROM plays a cousin role against capital flows. To be
particular, we test whether the effect of capital flows
on macroeconomic performance has changed with
the introduction of and changes with higher levels
of ROM usage. The empirical evidence gathered
from Turkey suggests that the introduction of the
ROM, as well as its higher usages, decreases the
effect of capital flow to itself (less persistent).
Moreover, the effects of capital flow on interest rate
and exchange rate also decrease with a higher ROM
usage. Thus, the existence of the ROMmight be used
as one tool the central banks of small open economies
may use to decrease the effect of capital flow on
financial markets.
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Appendix: Data sources
Variable Definition Code Source
GDP Real GDP TP.UR.G23 CBRT, EDDS
Int Simple interest rate weighted average (%) (overnight)+
1-week repo + weighted funding interest rate. After 3
October 2011, we used the CBRTweighted average
funding cost
TP.PY.P06.ON CBRT, EDDS
Output Industrial production (1992 = 100) TP.UR4.U01 CBRT, EDDS
Cpi General index, consumer (1987 = 100, general price index




Portfolio Gross portfolio investment, balance of payments detailed
presentation, monthly, million USD
TP.OD.Q099: II-B2 CBRT, EDDS
ROM TL required reserves held at CBRT as foreign currency and
gold, billion USD
CBRT (2013) CBRT (2013, p. 82)
CA Current account, balance of payments detailed presentation,
monthly, million USD
TP.OD.Q001:I CBRT, EDDS
USD USD/TRY exchange rate, selling prices TP.DK.USD.S.YTL.1 CBRT, EDDS
Effectiveness of the reserve option mechanism 6087
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